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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent seeks to have the judgment
sustained on appeal.
ISSUES STATED BY APPELLANT
The first three issues as set forth in Appellant's
brief at pages 1 and 2 are argumentative and set out
incorrect factual assumptions.
The initial statement of each issue is generally
correct.

Unfortunately, the statement of the issue is then

generally followed by an argumentative, misplaced assertion
of fact or facts in which the asserted facts are generally
incorrect.
With respect to the first issue, there is no basis
whatsoever for the assertion that the terms of the
handwritten agreement and the typewritten agreement were
materially different.

Further, there is no justification at

all for the statement that there were undisputed evidence
and stipulations prior to and during trial that both parties
intended commissions to be paid according to the rate
structure alleged by the Plaintiff.

The trial court in fact

found no such undisputed evidence or stipulations.

With

respect to the second issue, Defendant never admitted in its
Answer, or in its Response to Plaintiff's Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment, or at the hearing on the Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment and pre-trial conference, or at the
first day of trial that there was no dispute concerning the

1

rate structure as alleged by Plaintiff.

The Defendant

contended and the trial court in fact found that the rate
structure was that which was set forth in the typewritten
integrated agreement.

Further, Plaintiff's statement

concerning what the trial court ordered at the pre-trial
settlement conference is incorrect.

The trial court did not

order that the amounts prayed for by Plaintiff would be
deemed accurate unless Defendant advised Plaintiff prior to
trial with respect to any offsets or adjustments to which
Defendant claimed it was entitled.

What was stated in an

order, which was never signed by the trial court, was that
the amounts prayed for by Plaintiff "shall be deemed
accurate unless Defendant advises Plaintiff prior to trial
hereof of any facts, documents or information upon which
Defendant intends to rely with respect to afty offsets or
adjustments in said amount to which Defendant claims it is
entitled"

(R. 174)

unsigned order.

Defendant fully complied with the

Plaintiff was always advised that the

typewritten agreement was to be relied upon, and the
typewritten agreement states explicitly the applicable rate
structure and conclusively disproves the amounts for which
Plaintiff had prayed.
With respect to the third issue, Plaintiff states that
the Defendant had previously admitted that the rate
structure alleged by Plaintiff was accurate and that there
was no real dispute as to the amount of the debt.
2

This is

simply not true.

The Defendant at all times disputed the

amount of the debt and at all times relied upon the
typewritten agreement as being an integrated contract which
explicitly set forth the applicable, correct rate structure,
CORRECTIONS IN APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts set out in the Statement of Facts in
Appellant's brief from pages 9-14, are substantially
correct.

However, some of the facts set forth by Appellant

in that section of the brief are contested, and it is
believed essential for Respondent to at least point out the
contested nature of those facts.
Appellant states that Burningham and Dowdle initially
agreed that Lloyd's would receive $1.00 for every pound of
coffee extender product sold to Yurika.

Dcwdle testified

that such an agreement had been made, but Bufrningham
testified to the opposite. (Tr. 481)

Mr. Burningham

testified that there was no meeting of the minds as to the
commissions that would be paid to Lloyd's Unlimited until
the handwritten agreement was executed. (Tr. 479-480)

Such

a conclusion is certainly consistent with both parties
actions up to and including the signing of the written
agreements.
With respect to the rate structure in the handwritten
agreement, Appellant states that Lloyd's claims that the
rate on the handwritten agreement is 35C

and not .35$ .

This may by Lloyd's contention, but the court is referred to
3

the document itself, i.e., Exhibit 2.

Surely this court

will come to the same conclusion as the trial court.

The

rate (.35 *) for the 2 lb. bulk pack on the handwritten
agreement is clear and unambiguous.
Appellant claims in its brief, supposedly as a fact,
that Dowdle had made a mistake in writing the rate structure
in the handwritten agreement.
testimony was contradictory.

However, Dowdle's actual
Dowdle testified that he drew

up the handwritten agreement and that it was in his
handwriting. (Tr. 424,636)

Dowdle testified that the notes

or additions were in his handwriting. (Tr. 630, 636)

Dowdle

testified that the addition of the commission rates schedule
was made after presenting the handwritten agreement to
Burningham and after a discussion was had between he and
Burningham about the change. (Tr. 424,425)

Dowdle testified

that he had agreed to the addition of the commission rate
schedule in the handwritten agreement and that both parties
initialed the change or addition. (Tr. 426)
Appellant states in its brief that the typewritten
agreement was ambiguously or erroneously prepared with
respect to the commission rate schedule.
support for such a statement.

There is no

In fact, Dowdle testified

that he had the typewritten agreement prepared, that the
typewritten agreement was copied from the handwritten
agreement and further that the commission rate schedule was
taken directly from the handwritten original. (Tr. 634,637)
4

Dowdle testified that he read the typewritten agreement
after it was typed and that the typewritten agreement
contained the complete understanding of the terms of the
agreement. (Tr. 637).
The Statement of Facts from page 14 to page 19 of
Appellant's brief becomes highly argumentative.

Allegations

set forth as facts are hotly contested at best and simply
incorrect at worst.
Appellant attempts to establish as fact that Nature's
Way had admitted that the rate structure as advocated by
Lloyd's applied to any commissions to which Plaintiff was
entitled.

This simply is not so.

There is no basis for

such a "fact".
Appellant refers to the Answer and Counterclaim in
which Defendant by affirmative defense alleged that the
agreement was unenforceable because of failure of
consideration.

So what?

Defendant also made a general

denial of Plaintiff's complaint putting Plaintiff to its
proof of all allegations in the complaint.
Appellant refers to Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment wherein Defendant stated that it had no objection
to what Plaintiff had set out as uncontested facts.
Defendant at that time did not mention the controversy over
the rate structure.

Againf so what?

Defendant successfully

argued that there was ambiguity in the agreement and that
5

summary judgment was inappropriate.

Defendant may have made

a tactical miscalculation by placing all its eggs in one
basket at that time, but there was never an intent to
stipulate as to all other aspects of the case.
Appellant states as a "fact" that defendant stipulated
at the hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment that the rate
schedule proposed by Defendant was true and correct and
refers to Plaintiff's Statement of Proceedings of Unreported
Hearing (Appendix C of Appellant's brief).

However, there

was no stipulation made by Defendant, and the court is
referred to Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Statement
of Proceedings of Unreported Hearing (Appendix A to this
brief) and to the trial court's Findings on Statement of
Proceedings of Unreported Hearing (Appendix B to this
brief) .
Appellant further states as "fact" that the trial court
ordered at the hearing on January 22, 1985, "[t]he amounts
prayed for in Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment shall be deemed accurate unless Defendant advises
Plaintiff prior to trial hereof of any facts, documents or
information upon which Defendant intends to rely with
respect to any offsets or adjustments in said amount to
which Defendant claims it is entitled."

The trial court

never signed the proposed order. (R 713, 174)
proposed order.

It was only a

Evidently, the trial court did not agree

with such an order.
6

Further, Appellant states as "fact" that Defendant
failed to advise Plaintiff prior to the trial of any
adjustments to which it claims it was entitled.
statement is simply not true.

Such a

Even if the proposed order

had been signed by the trial court, it would have called for
Defendant to advise Plaintiff "prior to the trial hereof of
any facts, documents or information upon which Defendant
intends to rely with respect to any offsets or adjustments
in said amount to which Defendant claims it is entitled."
Defendant certainly did so advise Plaintiff.

The general

denial of Plaintiff's complaint put the amounts owed, if
anyf as commissions in dispute.

The agreement itself was

used to establish the correct rate schedule, and the
agreement was certainly brought to Plaintiff's attention
prior to the trial.
m

Appellant states as "fact" that Defendant stipulated at
trial that the amounts alleged by Plaintiff due as
commissions were accurate.

This again is simply not true.

Defendant did not stipulate as to the monetary amounts which
Plaintiff might recover if Plaintiff prevailed at trial.
That was left for the Judge to determine from the evidence
which was given, including Plaintiff's exhibit of the rate
schedule and amounts determined thereunder by their
accountant.

Defendant did not object to the entry of

Plaintiff's exhibits, but there was certainly no stipulation
as to the amounts which were alleged to be due as damages.
7

Damages were to be determined by the trial court from all
the evidence.

Defendant did stipulate as to the quantities

of product sold, but there was no stipulation as to amounts
owing Plaintiff.

(Appendix A and B)

At trial, Defendant

specifically stated that there was no objection "to what the
exhibit shows unless for some reason we can show that
[there] was a duplicate or for some other reason for saying
that's not an accurate amount." (Tr. 430)
saw the real issue.

The trial court

In talking about the accounting, Judge

Conder stated, "The real issue here is what was the
agreement." (Tr. 404)

In other words, what did the

agreement show as proper damages.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE:

THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS BY

THE TRIAL COURT SUPPORTING THE CONCLUSION THAT THE AGREEMENT
WAS AN INTEGRATED AGREEMENT WITH DEFENDANT BEING LIABLE FOR
COMMISSIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXPLICIT TERMS OF THE
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT.
POINT TWO:

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ESTOPPING DEFENDANT

FROM ASSERTING THAT THE AGREEMENT IS GOVERNED BY THE ACTUAL
RATE STRUCTURE WHICH WAS EXPLICITLY GIVEN IN THE INTEGRATED,
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT WAS CLEARLY NOT
IN ERROR IN CONSIDERING EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE EXPLICIT
RATE STRUCTURE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE INTEGRATED,
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT.
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POINT THREE:

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR REFORMATION OF THE

TYPEWRITTEN INTEGRATED AGREEMENT AND, THUS, THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING LLOYD'S LEAVE TO
FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT AND TO ASSERT A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR REFORMATION OF THE TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT.
POINT FOUR:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO

FIND A MUTUAL MISTAKE BETWEEN THE PARTIES OR IN REFUSING TO
REFORM THE TYPEWRITTEN, INTEGRATED AGREEMENT.
POINT FIVE:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING

THAT THE HANDWRITTEN AGREEMENT CONTAINED A COMMISSION RATE
STRUCTURE AT THE RATE OR . 35C
POINT SIX:

RATHER THAN THE RATE OF 35 <:

THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE

TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO AWARD PLAINTIFF COSTS OF DEPOSITIONS
AND OF A SUBPOENA ISSUED FOR TAKING THE DEPOSITION OF THE
PRESIDENT OF DEFENDANT.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS
BY THE TRIAL COURT SUPPORTING THE
CONCLUSION THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS AN
INTEGRATED AGREEMENT WITH DEFENDANT BEING
LIABLE FOR COMMISSIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
EXPLICIT TERMS OF THE TYPEWRITTEN
AGREEMENT.

Mr. Justice Wolfe in Stanley *v Stanley 97 Utah 520,
94 p.2d 465, 470, (1939), stated that the rule, with respect
to the duty of the Supreme Court in view of an Equity case,
was as follows:
9

"Our duty is to make an independent
examination of the record. If after that
we find
(1) The preponderance of the evidence supports
the trial court's findings of fact, or
(2) If there is coubt in our minds as to
where the preponderance liesf or
(3) We think the evidence as revealed by the
record may slightly preponderate against its
conclusions but such preponderance may well
be offset in favor of his conclusions by
having seen the witnesses and been able to judge
by their demeanor as to their credibility,
then we will not reverse."
See also Boccalero v Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126
P.2d 1063, (1942).
Respondent earnestly believes this Court will find the
relevant evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the
Respondent in this action.

Even in the unlikely

situation

wherein this Court has a doubt or believes that the evidence
may slightly preponderate against the findings of the trial
court, the rule set out in the Stanely case still dictates
that the decision by the trial court should not be reversed.
This is because even if there is a question in this Court's
minds as to where the preponderance lies or even if in this
Court believes there may be a slight preponderance against
the findings of the trial court, such questions should be
offset in favor of the trial court due to the trial court
having seen the witnesses and been able to judge by their
demeanor as to their credibility.
Appellant recognized that to mount a successful attack
on the trial court's findings of fact that it must marshall
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings
10

and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings even in the light most favorable to the
court below.

Appellant has failed to marshal all the

relevant evidence and has not shown that that evidence is
insufficient in a view most favorable to the court below to
support the trial court's findings.
Paragraphs 3 through 6 of the Findings of Fact are said
by Appellant to be inaccurate, inconsistent and against the
weight of evidence.

This is clearly not so.

As to finding number 3, the relevant evidence includes
the testimony of Dowdle that he prepared the handwritten
agreement, that there was a discussion wherein Burningham
suggested changes to add the commission rate schedule, that
Dowdle, incorporated in his own handwriting the rate
schedule into the agreement and that both parties agreed to
the handwritten rate schedule and initialed the added rate
schedule. (Tr. 424-425, 630, 636). Burningham testimony was
essentially the same. (Tr. 474-481, 490-492, 584-590)
With respect to findings Nos. 4 and 5 concerning the
rates in the rate schedules of the handwritten and
typewritten agreements, the documents themselves show the
rate schedules, and this court can readily determine that
there was clear basis for the findings concerning the rate
structures within the rate schedules.
With respect to finding number 6 that the intent of the
parties did not change between the execution of the
11

handwritten and typewritten agreements, the testimony by
both parties as mentioned in the second paragraph above
clearly establishes that the typewritten agreement was
prepared from the handwritten agreement and that the intent
of the parties did not change between the execution of the
handwritten and typewritten agreements.
Appellant attempts to cast a doubt on the findings,
numbers 3-6, by way of irrelevant, unrelated material in the
form of a red herring.

Appellant states that Dowdle

testified that the original oral agreement between the
parties provided a commission rate of $1.00 per pound.
if that were so, so what?

Even

The parties specifically set down

and negotiated the written integrated agreements.

The rate

schedule of the written integrated agreements was negotiated
and certainly took the place of any nebulous, oral
commission rate that may have previously been discussed
between the parties.

It is here further pointed out that

Burningham totally denied that he ever orally agreed to a
commission of $1.00 per pound. (Tr. 480-481)

Appellant

makes a dubious claim that Burningham later admitted the
existence of an earlier oral agreement providing a
commission of $1.00.

Appellant cites the Record or

Transcript at page 593.
that page.

It is interesting to quote from

The questions are by Appellant's trial counsel

and the answers are by Burningham.
Q. Do you recall any conversation where you
asked him who was involved in this new
multi-level, national food sales program?
12

A. Mr. Dowdle w o u l d n ' t t e l l me who was
involved.
Q.

He w o u l d n ' t t e l l you, r i g h t —

A.

No.

Q. — until he had a deal on a dollar a
pound, isn't that true?
A. That's correct, un huh.
huh.

That's true, uh,

Respondent will leave it to this court as to whether
such an exchange is an admission by Burningham as to a
previous oral agreement involving a commission rate of $1.00
a pound or an admission that Mr. Dowdle wouldn't tell
Burningham who was involved in the food sales program.
Appellant brings up the fact that a check for $500.00
was paid to Lloyds.

This is totally unrelated to the

findings numbers 4-6.

In addition, Appellant concedes that

the $500.00 was paid without any formal accounting.
Appellant says that the trial court erred in its
findings as to the commission rate of the handwritten
agreement.

Appellant contends that no decimal point is

included before 35 C .

This court is referred to the

document itself (Exhibit 2 ) . It is completely evident and
there is basis for the finding that there is a decimal point
before the 35 C . What else is the marking which appears
before the 35 £ ?

Appellant's attorneys raised the

possibility in an unreported hearing before the trial court
that the mark before the 35* is a period.
13

The trial judge

rejected that contention.

The judge concluded that the

mark was a decimal and that it was before the 35C .
Appellant, at page 23 of its brief, alleges that
Defendant admitted the parties intent was the rate structure
set forth by Plaintiff.

According to Appellant, such

admissions are supposedly in Defendant's Answer, in its
response to the motion for Suxiunary Judgment at hearings and
on the first day of trial.

Yet, interestingly Appellant

does not include any references to the record herein to
establish such admission.

That is quite understandable,

there is no such admission.
Appellant contends that findings numbers 4-6 are
inherently inconsistent.

Appellant points out what is said

to be a material difference in the rate structure of the
handwritten and typewritten agreements.

The typewritten

agreement recites .50 £ whereas the handwritten agreement
shows 50 £ . There is, however, no inconsistency in the
trial courts findings.

The typewritten agreement was an

integration of an superceded the handwritten agreement, and
the trial court probably concluded that the intent at the
time the handwritten agreement was modified by Mr. Dowdle
was to recite .50* instead of 50 * .

Such a conclusion is

certainly not unsupported.
As pointed out above, the unambiguous testimony out of
the mouth of Mr. Dowdle certainly stablishes that an arm's

14

length negotiation occurred relating to the commission rate
structure of the handwritten agreement and that Mr. Dowdle
prepared the typewritten agreement from the handwritten
agreement.

Plaintiff did not at any time until after trial,

suggest that there was any material difference in the
handwritten and typewrittne agreements.

The preponderance

of evidence clearly supports the findings of the trial
court.
POINT TWO
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ESTOPPING DEFENDANT FROM
ASSERTING THAT THE AGREEMENT IS GOVERNED
BY THE ACTUAL RATE STRUCTURE WHICH WAS
EXPLICITLY GIVEN IN THE INTEGRATED,
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT
WAS CLEARLY NOT IN ERROR IN CONSIDERING
EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE EXPLICIT RATE
STRUCTURE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE INTEGRATED,
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT.
Appellant did not raise the question of estoppel, prior
to its past trial memorandums and this appeal, and there was
no objection made by Plaintiff at trial when evidence was
admitted concerning the commission rate structure to be
applied under the agreement.

By failing to raise the

question of estoppel during trial, and by failing to object
at trial, Appellant has waived any right to try such issues
on appeal.

Appellant would apparently like this Court to

now act as a trial court and consider the issue of estoppel
de novo.

Further, inasmuch as Plaintiff made no objection

to admitting evidence during trial, Plaintiff is itself

15

stopped from alleging now that the trial court erred in
allowing such evidence.
Applicant has used pretty good imagination in
suggesting an issue relating to estoppel.
merits, there is no basis for estoppel.

But, even on the
It is well

established that to constitute an estoppel, there must be
conduct amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of
material facts, and such facts must be known to the party
sought to be estopped and unknown to the party who claims
benefit of the estoppel.

Cook v Cook, 174 P.2d 434, at

436 (Utah 1946), Coombs v Ouzounian, 465 P.2d 356, at 358
(Utah 1970).

Contrary to the allegations made by Appellant,

there was no new claim raised by Defendant on the second day
of trial.

The typewritten agreement contained a specific

rate schedule for commissions.

Evidence of the specific

rates included in that schedule was introduced on the second
day of trial, but that certainly did not encompass a new
claim.

The claim was based on the face of the agreement

upon which Plaintiff had brought suit.
There was no misrepresentation or concealment of
material facts.

The rate schedule included in the agreement

was as well known to Plaintiff as it was by Defendant.
Appellant argues that Defendant had admitted to the
rate schedule which had been proposed by Plaintiff.
simply not so.

At no time did Defendant agree that

commissions should be paid at the rate proposed in
16

This is

Plaintiff's suggested rate schedule.

Appellant does not

cite any portion of the record other than a deposition of
Burningham for support of its theory.

In his deposition,

Burningham responded to an ambiguous, theoretical question
about what a payment may have been if he had made payment.
Unfortunately, Burningham was led into an improvident answer
by Plaintiff's counsel, and Burningham1s counsel must have
been sleeping.

However, the vague answer given by

Burningham during the deposition in no way estops Defendant
from litigating the integrated, written agreement to enforce
the the actual commission rate as explicitly given in the
integrated agreement.

As stated in 8 Wright & Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure Section 2181 at 579, "A party
may be embarrassed by his answer to a pretrail interrogatory
in which he took a position different from one that he later
asserts, and it is right that he should have to explain his
change of position, but his answer to the interrogatory
should not be a bar to taking a different position at the
trial."
POINT THREE
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR REFORMATION OF THE
TYPEWRITTEN, INTEGRATED AGREEMENT AND,
THUS, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING LLOYD'S LEAVE TO FILE
AN AMENDED COMPLAINT AND TO ASSERT A CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR REFORMATION OF THE
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT.
The trial court found that there was no basis for
granting Plaintiff's attempt to reform the typewritten,
17

integrated agreement.

The trial court clearly did not abuse

its discretion in denying Plaintiff's leave to file an
amended complaint for reformation of the typewritten
agreement.

There is no basis for reforming the contract,

and in fact any such reformation would be in direct
opposition to the universal law respecting integrated
agreements.
In Plaintiff's own memorandum in support of its Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, it quite adequately set out
the law.

The following three paragraphs are taken directly

from the Plaintiff's previous memorandum:
The universal law with respect to the interpretation of
contracts in this state is that the meaning of the contract
is to be determined from the instrument itself and the court
has the duty to first examine the language of the contract
and accord to it the weight and effect which it demonstrates
is intended.

E.g.,Wingets, Inc. vs. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d

231, 500 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1972); Big Butte Ranch, Inc. vs
Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977); Overson vs. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 587 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah
1978) .
A corollary to this fundamental maxim is that when the
parties have reduced to writing what appears to be a
complete and certain agreement, it will be conclusively
presumed, in the absence of fraud, that the writing contains
the whole of the agreement between the parties.
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In this

regard, the conclusive presumption also precludes the
introduction of any parol evidence of prior or
contemporaneous conversationsf representations, or
statements for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms
of the written agreement.

State Bank of Lehi vs. Woolsey,

565 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1977); Williams vs. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 198 Kan. 331, 424 P.2d 541, 548 (1967).

The rule has

long been established that evidence of prior or concurrent
negotiations are inadmissable to contradictive terms of what
appears to be a final agreement.

Lamb vs. Bangart, 525

P.2d 602 (Utah 1974).
The length to which Utah law will not alter a final
contract is identified in Skousen vs. Smith, 27 Utah 2d
169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972).

In that case, Plaintiff brought

an action on a promissory note executed by the Defendant.
The basis of the Defendant's defense in the action was the
word "on" contained in the note was incorrect and should be
substituted with the word "of" in its place.

The Court

refused to allow parol evidence on the matter, and refused
to allow the Defendant to allege that the note did not mean
what it clearly stated

and held:

"It is axiomatic that the language in a
written instrument is interpreted more
strongly against the scrivener who executed it.
It is equally elementary that parties may be
bound by the language they deliberately use
in their contracts, irrespective of the
fact that it appears to result in
improvidence beyond and perhaps in excess
of what the mythical, reasonable prudent
man might feel constrained to venture."
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493 P.2d at 1005. (R. 119-121)
In the memorandum in support of its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff specifically admitted "The
Agreement is a fully integrated final document with clear,
unambiguous terms (emphasis added) with respect to
commissions to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff." (R. 124)
It is indeed clear that the terms with respect to
commissions were unambiguous and contained no inadvertent
error.

As pointed out previously, the handwritten and

typewritten agreements were both prepared by Mr. Dowdle.
Mr. Dowdle was completely consistent each time in the exact
figures used in the schedule of commissions contained in the
agreements.

The explicit terms were deliberately used at

least two separate times.

As was approximately stated by

the Utah Supreme Court in the Skousen vs. Smith decision
cited above,
It is equally elementary that parties may be
bound by the language they deliverately
use in their contracts, irrespective of
the fact that it appears to result in
improvidence beyond and perhaps in excess
of what the mythical, reasonable, prudent
man might feel constrained to venture
493 P.2d at 1005.
Granting reformation in the present situation would be
in direct contravention of the universal law relating to
integrated documents.

There is simply no basis upon which

such a drastic action by this court can be supported.

The

trial court heard the evidence and by the demeanor of the
witnesses judged the credibility of the witnesses.
20

The

preponderance of evidence shows as pointed out previously
that the addition of the explicit rate schedule was made
after arm lengths negotiation.

Such evidence certainly

shows that the trial court exercised sound discretion, and
certainly did not abuse its discretion, in denying
Plaintiff's leave to file an amended complaint and to assert
a cause of actioan for reformation of the typewritten,
integrated agreement.
POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
TO FIND A MUTUAL MISTAKE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES OR IN REFUSING TO REFORM THE
TYPEWRITTEN, INTEGRATED AGREEMENT
There is no basis for reforming the integrated,
typewritten agreement.

Contrary to Appellant's contention

there is no indication whatsoever that there was a mutual
mistake or any mistake at all made at the time the
typewritten agreement was finally executed.

Dowdle

testified specifically that he wrote the commission schedule
into the agreement from figures which had been supplied by
Burningham and which were agreeable to both the parties.
(Tr. 425, 632, 633)

The figures which Dowdle wrote into the

handwritten agreement were exactly those which appear in the
typewritten agreement.

There was no error in the

typewritten agreement.
Further indication that there was no mistake of any
kind including a scriveners error, is found in the
handwritten and typewritten agreements themselves.
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Both the

handwritten and the type written agreements show a cent sign
( £) used with the first three rates.
used with the fourth rate.

A dollar sigh ($) was

(Exhibits 2 and 3)

Dowdlef

having been engaged in the selling profession for at least a
substantial portion of his working life, certainly knows the
difference between a cent sign and a dollar sign.
Burningham.

So does

The explicit and consistent use of the cent

sign and the dollar sign indicate that those signs were used
with knowledge and intent to enumerate the specific rates
given in the schedule of rates.
There is no mistake in the present case.

The equitable

doctrine of reformation has no application in the present
situation and certainly cannot overcome the legal principle
that parol evidence cannot be used to vary or change the
express written provisions in an integrated agreement.
In Sine v Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571 (1950)
this court recognized that the right of reformation whenever
allowed is necessarily an invasion or limitation of the
parol evidence rule.

Recognizing the drastic nature of

reformation, this court set out criteria which must be met
before reformation can be considered.

Justice Latimer

stated for the court:
No such relief, however, can be granted, either
when the contract is executory or
executed, and no parol evidence can be
used to modify the terms of a written
instrument, and most emphatically when that
instrument is required by the statute of
frauds to be in writing, except upon the
occasion of mistake, surprise or fraud;
one or the other of these incidents must be
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alleged and proved before a resort can be
had to parol evidence in such cases.
Id. 222 P. 2d at 579.
In the present case, there is no mistake, surprise, or
fraud.

There is no miscopying of a description as in the

Sine v Harper case.

Dowdle, the chief officer of

Plaintiff corporation, prepared the written agreements.

Two

handwritten forms were prepared and a £inal typewritten
form. (Tr. 425, 4262, 427, 637)

In the two handwritten

forms, Dowdle wrote in his own handwriting, the exact
schedule of commissions as appears in the final typewritten
agreement.

Dowdle testified that the rate schedule was

negotiated between himself and Burningham and that both he
and Burningham had approved and agreed to the rate schedule.
There is no mistake.

Dowdle deliberately wrote the specific

commission schedule in exact terms three separate times.
The second copy of the handwritten agreement, as
included in the record at pages 227-229, was submitted after
trial in an Affidavit of Burningham.

The trial court

improperly struck the Affidavit of Burningham, even though
allowing an Affidavit of Dowdle.

The Affidavit of

Burningham was simply a rebuttal to the post trial arguments
of Plaintiff.

This court is referred, however, to the

second copy of the handwritten agreement at pages 227-229 of
the Record.

As will be seen in the handwriting of Dowdle,

the commission rate schedule is precisely and exactly the
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same as the commission rate schedule in the typewritten
agreement.
As to the burden of establishing that an inadvertent
mistake had been made, this courtf approving the general
rule given in Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section
511, stated in the Sine v. Harper case:
It is essential in order to obtain a decree
rescinding or reforming a written conveyance,
contract, assignment or discharge for
mistake, that the fact necessasry for the
allowance of the remedy shall be proved by
clear and convincing evidence and not by
a mere preponderance. (222 P.2d at 580)
This court in the Sine v. Harper case cited with
approval, the case of George v Fritsch Loan & Trust Co. 69
Utah 460f 256 P. 400 (1927), wherein Mr. Justice Hansen
stated the law in this jurisdiction to be as follows:
The law is well settled in this and other
jurisdictions that a written contract
will be reformed to express the agreement
of the parties where the proof of the
mistake is clear, definite, and
convincing, and where the party seeking the
reformation is not guilty of negligence in
the execution of the contract nor of laches
in making timely application for its
reformation. 256 P. at 403.
In the present case, there is no showing of mistake,
and certainly no showing by clear and convincing evidence as
opposed to a mere preponderance.

In fact, the preponderance

of evidence is that no mistake occurred.

Mr. Dowdle wrote

the commission rate schedule three separate times, and he
testified that the commission rate schedulehad been
specifically approved and agreed upon by him and Burningham.
24

In the dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Pratt in
Sine v, Harper, the Chief Justice points out that the
mistake in the Sine v. Harper situation was created by the
moving party.

The Chief Justice would not have allowed the

reformation under that situation.

The Chief Justice stated:

We have here a peculiar situation of an
agent of the complaining party preparing
the instruments in which the error could
have been ascertained and corrected by a
bit of careful examination of the papers
involved. 222 P. 2d at 5881
In the present case, Dowdle, the principal agent of the
moving party, wrote the commission rate schedule by hand in
the two handwritten agreements and had the typewritten
agreement prepared.

Dowdle testified that he read and

studied the agreements prior to signing them.

If there had

been any error, he could have ascertained the error and
corrected it.

The inescapable conclusion is that no mistake

was made nor included in the three separate written
agreements.
Further, even if there had been a mistake, Plaintiff is
clearly guilty of laches in making timely application for
its reformation.

Mr. Justice Hansen in the George v.

Fritsch Loan & Trust Co. case as cited in the Sine v.
Harper case, clearly pointed out that the law is well
settled that reformation will not be allowed where the party
seeking the reformation is guilty of negligence in the
execution of the contract or of laches in making timely
application for its reformation.
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In the present case, the

agreements were made in August of 1982, and Plaintiff has
delayed until after trial in January of 1985 to ask for
reformation of the contract.

A clearer instance of laches

would be hard to find.
The evidence clearly supports the trial court's
decision to reject Plaintiff's attempt to reform the
contract.

There is no basis for this court to reverse the

decision of the trial court.
POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT DID LSIOT ERR IN FINDING
THAT THE HANDWRITTEN AGREEMENT
CONTAINED A COMMISSION RATE
STRUCTURE AT THE RATE OF .35 CENTS
RATHER THAN THE RATE OF 35 CENTS.
Appellant argues that there is no decimal point before
the 35 * in the handwritten agreement. (Exhibit 2 ) . The
trial court found in fact that the decimal point did exist.
This court need only look at the handwritten agreement
(Exhibit 2) to undoubtedly agree that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in making such a finding.
POINT SIX
THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO AWARD
PLAINTIFF COSTS OF DEPOSITIONS AND
OF A SUBPOENA ISSUED FOR TAKING THE
DEPOSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF DEFENDANT.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing
to award Plaintiff costs of depositions and costs of service
of a subpoena upon Burningham, the president of the
Defendant corporation.
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At the time of the deposition of Burningham,
interrogatories had been answered and documents had been
produced in response to a request for production.

The

material produced at trial came from the documents which
were produced.

Plaintiff also obtained documents directly

from the Yurika Corporation concerning sales made by
Defendant to Yurika.
necessary.

The deposition of Burningham was not

The deposition was not published nor used at

trial.
With respect to the deposition of Webb, the deposition
was long and costly.

At trial, Plaintiff's counsel admitted

that counsel did not propose to interrogate Webb on the
stand with respect to "everything in the deposition by far."
(Tr. 519)

The trial court questioned the relevancy of most

of the material of which Webb was to testify.

The testimony

of Webb was short, and his deposition was not published nor
used at tiral.
In First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 521
P.2d 563 (Utah 1974) this court stated*
The allowance of such costs is governed
by these propositions: The burden is upon
the claiming party to establish that they
are necessary and reasonable; the determination
of whether that burden is met is within the
sound discretion of the trial court; and
unless it is shown that the refusal to allow
them is arbitrary, or a clear abuse of
discretion, his ruling will not be disturbed.
In the present case, the trial court undoubtedly found
that the discovery could have been accomplished through less
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expensive methods, such as interrogatories, requests for
production of documents and requests for admissions.

The

trial court clearly did not abuse his discretion, and his
ruling should not be disturbed on appeal.
The trial court was eminently correct in his refusal to
award the costs of the service of a subpoena on Burningham.
Plaintiff failed to contact counsel for the Defendant
corporation to see if the corporation would produce its
president Burningham for a deposition.

The costs of the

service of subpoena could have been avoided by a simple
telephone call.

There certainly was no abuse of discretion

in refusing to allow the costs of service of the subpoena.
CONCLUSION
The preponderance of the evidence clearly supports the
trial court's findings and judgment.

Therefore, Respondent

respectfully requests this court to affirm the decision of
the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,

TERRY $. CRELLIN
Attorney for
Defendant-Respondent

J/^y
28

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This will certify that four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent on Appeal from the
Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, Honorable Dean E. Conder, were mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following named individual at the address
listed below this

/tf

day of May, 198$:

KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD
Law Office of Ray G. Martineau
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South STate STreet
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX "A"

TERRY M. CRELLIN (USB #0755)
Thorpe, North & Western
9662 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 5 6 6-6633
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a
corporation,
Plaintiff,

NATURE'S WAY
MARKETING, LTD.,
a corporation.

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF
PROCEEDINGS OF UNREPORTED
HEARING
Civil No. C83-6058
(Judge Dean E. Conder!

Defendant.
Pursuant to Utah R. Ap. P. 11(g), Defendant objects to
the proposed statement as to the proceedings of the hearing
held before the above-entitled Court on January 22, 1985.
Unfortunately, no transcript of the•proceedings was made by
the Court Reporter, and the Statement of Proceedings, as
proposed by Plaintiff, is seriously incorrect and
unsubstantiated in many material aspects.
Defendant agrees with the first paragraph of
Plaintiff's proposed Statement of Proceedings.

At the

hearing on January 22, 1985, the Court considered two
matters, plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
file herein dated January 4, 1985, and a Pre-trial

1

Settlement Conference, pursuant to Court Order dated

2

November 26, 1984, on file herein.

3

Defendant does not agree with the second paragraph of

4

Plaintiff's proposed Statement of Proceedings,

5

At the

hearing, defendant, through its counsel, definitely did not

6

stipulate that there was no issue with respect to the

7

amounts, if any, due and owing by it to plaintiff as sought

8

in Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on file

9

herein dated January 4, 1985, pursuant to that certain

io n Agreement between plaintiff and defendant dated August 16,
11

1982.

12

the number of items which were shipped by defendant.

13

issue with respect to the amounts, if any, due for such

16

shipments.

17

schedule of items shipped but specifically stated that there

19

was no agreement as to the monetary amounts due even if the

20

contract were found to be valid.

21

Judgment was that the Agreement was unenforceable because

23

there was no indication in the Agreement that any actual

24

consideration for the contract was given by olaintiff.

25

The

question of the monetary amounts prayed for by plaintiff, or

^

as to the commissions to be paid by defendant for sales

WESTERN

101)566-6633

Defendant's principal

opposition to plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary

22

UTH STATE STREET 2 7

This point was again brought up at the very

beginning of the trial, wherein defendant agreed to the

18

3Y, UTAH 84070

At

no time, however, did defendant stipulate that there was no

15

2

Those

figures had been produced by defendant during discovery.

14

)RPE. NORTH

Defendant did agree that there was no dispute as to

| |

defendant made, were not materially addressed other than

that defendant agreed that there was no dispute as to the
number of items shipped by defendant.

The major thrust of

defendant's arguments was that there were questions of fact
concerning the question of consideration and that because of
those questions of fact, there could be no valid Partial
Summary Judgment in favor of plaintiff.

The court agreed,

and the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was
denied.

Plaintiff's counsel is clearly mistaken in. the

alleged recollection that defendant, through its counsel,
admitted that there was no dispute as to the amounts owing
under the Agreement, if the Agreement was found to be
enforceable.

If anything, the exact opposite contention was

maintained, and as pointed out above, the point that
defendant did not stipulate to the monetary amounts due was
stressed to the Court at the beginning of the trial.
DATED this

/9*k

day of March, 1986.

fi/h
TERRY M. ORELLIN
Attorney for Defendant

JC*A
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This will certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Statement of
Proceedings of Unreported Hearing was served upon the
following, by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to
the address listed below this

//

day of March, 1986:
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KEVIN J. 3UTTERFI2LD
LESLIE W. SLAUGH
Law Offices of Ray G. Martineau
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84111

APPENDIX "B"

KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (USB #3872)
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (USB #3752)
LAW OFFICES OF RAY G. MARTINEAU, P.C
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt. Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2400
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a
corporation,

FINDINGS ON STATEMENT OF
PROCEEDINGS OF UNREPORTED
HEARING

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C83-6058

NATURE'S WAY MARKETING, LTD.,
a corporation,
Defendant.

(Judge Dean E. Conder)

Plaintiff's Statement of Proceedings of Unreported
Hearing and defendant's objection thereto came on regularly for
hearing before the Honorable Dean E. Conder of the aboveentitled Court, on April 1, 1986, plaintiff appearing by and
through its counsel, Kevin J. Sutterfield, and defendant
appearing by and through its counsel, Terry M.

Crellin, and

the Court having heard argument of counsel, and having reviewed
the file, now makes and enters the following:
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that defendant stipulated at
the hearing held before this Court on January 22, 1985 to
-1-

plaintiff's evidence of the quantities of product sold by
defendant to the third party upon which the claim for commissions made by plaintiff was based.
THE COURT MAKES NO FINDING as to whether defendant
stipulated at the hearing to plaintiff's claim for the amounts
owing plaintiff by defendant as set forth in Plaintiff's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and memorandum and affidavit in
support thereof because the Court does not remember whether
such a stipulation took place.
MADE AND ENTERED this

day of April, 1986:

BY THE COURT:

Dean E. Conder
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This will certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings on Statement of Proceedings of Unreported
Hearing was served upon the following, by mailing a copy
thereof, postage prepaid, to the address listed below this
day of April, 1986.
Terry M. Crellin, Esq.
M. Wayne Western
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN
9662 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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